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Abstract
The international tax system is the result of the interaction
of different actors who share the responsibility for its integ-
rity. States and multinational corporations both enjoy to a
certain extent freedom of choice with regard to their tax
behaviour – which entails moral responsibility. Making,
interpreting and using tax rules therefore is inevitably a mat-
ter of exercising responsibility. Both should abstain from
viewing tax laws as a bunch of technical rules to be used as
a tool without any intrinsic moral or legal value. States bear
primary responsibility for the integrity of the international
tax system. They should become more reticent in their use
of tax as regulatory instrument – competing with one
another for multinationals’ investment. They should also act
more responsibly by cooperating to make better rules to
prevent aggressive tax planning, which entails a shift in tax
payments from very expert taxpayers to other taxpayers.
Here, the distributive justice of the tax system and a level
playing field should be guaranteed. Multinationals should
abstain from putting pressure on states and lobbying for
favourable tax rules that disproportionally affect other tax-
payers – SMEs and individual taxpayers alike. Multinationals
and their tax advisers should avoid irresponsible conduct by
not aiming to pay a minimalist amount of (corporate
income) taxes – merely staying within the boundaries of the
letter of the law. Especially CSR-corporations should assume
the responsibility for the integrity of the tax system.
Keywords: flawed legislation, tax privileges, tax planning,
corporate social responsibility, tax professionals
1 Introduction
In recent years international tax law has become a hotly
disputed topic. The public outcry over the aggressive
tax planning practices of multinational enterprises and
the lack of effective rules and cooperation between states
to counter these practices with fair and effective rules
shows deep concerns about the integrity of the interna-
tional tax system. Rebuilding public trust in the integri-
ty of the tax system has thus become an urgent matter.
OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Proj-
ect proposes improvements in order to ensure more
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responsible fiscal behaviour of both governments and
multinationals to bring the eroding of the integrity of
the (international) tax system to a halt.
BEPS aims at improving the integrity of the internal tax
system. This integrity has been hollowed out by both
multinationals and states. On the one hand, multina-
tionals gaming the tax system, minimising their tax lia-
bility, erode this integrity. They do not pay their share
though everyone, both citizens and companies, should
contribute to the financing of public expenditure every-
one benefits from. On the other hand, the rules of the
game are set by countries competing for multinationals’
investment by lowering corporate tax costs. Both multi-
nationals and states compete at an international level.
Who is to be held responsible for the erosions of the tax
system? Multinationals or states? This is the question to
be answered in this article. It is a moral question for tax-
ation is a moral phenomenon, as will be argued. Both
actors probably interact. Of course, other actors play a
role as well. Thus, the integrity of the tax system may
appear to be a shared responsibility, but, if so, are these
actors equally responsible?
The societal relevance of this issue is out of question.
Taxes are the main funding for society and for individu-
al liberty to flourish. Moreover, they are an important
means to enhance distributive justice. But the issue at
stake is also of theoretical relevance. Tax theory does
not provide yet a detailed and balanced view on the
question of moral responsibility.
As for methodology, the research question calls for an
interdisciplinary approach. This article places itself at
the intersection of tax law, fiscal sociology, (business)
ethics, economics and legal philosophy. Academic litera-
ture is the primary source but incidentally reference will
also be made to reports and non-academic articles.
This article is structured as follows. First the concept of
responsibility will be applied in tax context. It will
appear that both states and multinationals, and their
advisers, make choices that affect the international tax
system. Freedom of choice, however, entails moral
responsibility. They are therefore both responsible for
the integrity of the tax system – although states are pri-
marily responsible. Then the behaviour of states and
multinational corporations will be evaluated from this
perspective on responsibility. States should in a cooper-
ative effort improve the tax system. Companies endors-
ing corporate social responsibility, and their tax advis-
ers, should avoid acting irresponsibly and therefore not
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engage in aggressive tax planning. The argument will be
wrapped up in a conclusion.
2 Integer Taxation: A Shared
Responsibility
2.1 Introduction
The public outcry over aggressive tax planning and the
failure of the international tax system regards the distri-
bution of the tax burden over members of society. Many
(corporate) taxpayers command the kind of resources
that enable them to plan their taxes in a very sophistica-
ted and successful manner – they pay hardly any
(income) taxes at all, thus shifting the tax burden to less
expert taxpayers. The tax rules put in place by states are
apparently unable to prevent this kind of behaviour.
Thus one of the fundamental principles of the tax sys-
tem, i.e. distributive justice, is seriously impaired. The
notion of distributive justice entails that society is seen
as responsible for the condition of the less well of and
capable of changing it. Distributive justice calls on the
state – as an intermediary – to guarantee that ‘everyone
is supplied with a certain level of material means.’1 The
tax system serves distributive justice. According to the
legal philosopher Dworkin the ideal of integrity in law
requires a commitment to a coherent set of principles,
‘the promise that law will be chosen, changed and devel-
oped and interpreted in an overall principled way’.2
This also goes for tax law, which therefore should meet
the requirement of principled consistency.3 Unfortu-
nately, it does not, for both legal principles and non-
legal principles are often seriously neglected. No won-
der, trust in the integrity of the tax system, governments
and multinationals is under pressure. This illustrates
the foundational nature of tax.
Taxes are paid for the government to secure the func-
tioning of the market and achieve various public goods
and services sustaining society. They are payments to
the state on behalf of society. Indeed as Thomas Piketty
writes: ‘Without taxes, society has no common destiny,
and collective action is impossible.’4 Thus taxation is a
moral phenomenon.5 There are other dimensions, of
course, be it economic, legal, political or democratic, to
name some, but the moral dimension cannot be dis-
1. S. Fleischacker, A Short History of Distributive Justice, Cambridge
(MA) / London: Harvard University Press (2004), at 4.
2. R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire, Cambridge (MA) / London: Harvard Univer-
sity Press (1986), at 300-1.
3. Cf. E.J. McCaffery, ‘Tax’s Empire’, 85 The Georgetown Law Journal
(1996), at 107.
4. T. Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Cambridge (MA) / Lon-
don: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press (2014), at 493.
5. P. Sloterdijk, Die nehmende Hand und die gebende Seite, Berlin: Suhr-
kamp Verlag (2010). One of the interviews in the book (at 141-5) is
titled ‘Steuern sind das zentrale moralische Phänomen unserer Zivilisa-
tion.’ Cf. J.L.M. Gribnau, ‘Voluntary Compliance Beyond the Letter of
the Law: Reciprocity and Fair Play’, in B. Peeters, J.L.M. Gribnau & J.
Badisco (eds.), Building Trust in Taxation, Cambridge: Intersentia
(2017).
pensed with. Therefore, the behaviour of the law-mak-
ing and law-applying institutions – legislature, tax
administration and courts – that are involved in taxation
affects the moral dimension. These actors are responsi-
ble for the design and actual workings of the tax system.
Their behaviour needs ethical evaluation. The same
seems to go for the behaviour of (corporate) taxpayers.
Tax evasion and aggressive tax planning entail evidently
not contributing a fair share to society. This suggests
that the issue of responsibility is at stake.
The integrity of tax law and tax systems is thus of great
importance to society. Law makers should therefore act
responsibly with regard to tax law. Responsible law
making entails adequate rules. As Fuller argues, there
must be rules in order to guide human conduct. This
minimal requirement of the ‘generality of law is a bul-
wark against arbitrariness’.6 The legislature, however,
should strive for more than a minimum level of legality.
As Machiavelli maintained, laws can man make good
(though not perfect).7 Skinner comments on this famous
idea: ‘the law can be used to force us out of our habitual
patterns of self-interested behaviour, to force us into the
full range of our civic duties’.8 An integer system of tax
laws thus makes people behave better than a system
seriously lacking in fairness. However, there may be
other actors bearing responsibility for international tax
law, for corporations’ behaviour affect the tax burden of
other taxpayers. This raises the question whether there
is room for responsibility with regard to this (indirect)
interaction with other taxpayers. Note that states by way
of taxation determine what citizens have to contribute to
the resources needed to sustain society, that is, what
they owe to their fellow citizens.
In this context, responsibility is a moral rather than a
legal concept. First, the relationship between law and
morality has therefore to be explored. Second, the con-
cept of ‘moral responsibility’ should be elucidated – and
its relationship with freedom.
2.2 Law and Morality
The legal system is distinguished from ethics. The legal
system can be seen as a formal public system containing
norms regulating (corporate) citizens’ behaviour; it gov-
erns behaviour affecting other persons.9 Like the legal
system, morality regulates individuals’ behaviour, it
addresses not only the question as to how one ought to
live as an individual, but also how individuals should
interact with other individuals. Morality is also a public
system, in the sense that there is shared understanding
6. L.L. Fuller, The Morality of Law [1964], New Haven (CT) / London:
Yale University Press (1977), at 46-9.
7. N. Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, Chicago / London: Chicago Univer-
sity Press (1996), I.iii, at 15.
8. Q. Skinner, ‘The Republican Ideal of Political Liberty’, in G. Bock, Q.
Skinner & M. Viroli (eds.), Machiavelli and Republicanism, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press (1990), at 305.
9. The legal philosopher Hart called these rules ‘primary rules of obliga-
tion’. A system of laws consists also of so-called secondary rules that
provide for the authoritative recognition of legal rules and for changing
the rules, and adjudicating ‘disputes as to whether an admitted rule has
or has not been violated’; H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford:
Oxford University Press (2012), at 93.
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and knowledge about how one should act, and that it is
not irrational to be guided and judged by that common
morality. This informal public system includes moral
rules, principles, values, ideals and virtues, which, how-
ever, may entail conflicting and competing demands.
Unlike the legal system, morality is an informal public
system. There are no judges who have the authority to
decide on moral conflicts nor formal decision proce-
dures that provide unique and definite answers to all
moral questions.10 Therefore, though law is one thing,
and ethics another, they are connected.
The tax rules should grosso modo reflect public morali-
ty, but there is no identicalness between the two. The
legal system will never be able to exhaustively codify
public morality – neither should it strive for that. Ethi-
cal responsibilities are thus not exhaustively codified in
the law. The same goes for the tax rules, which have to
reflect by and large the prevailing views (public morali-
ty) with regard to the fair distribution of the tax burden
and the ways tax can be used to enhance the lives of the
members of society. These legal rules should also be
established and applied in conformity with fundamental
legal values – which reflect important social and moral
values.
Legal responsibilities reflect a view of ‘codified ethics’
in the sense that they embody basic notions of fair prac-
tices as established by law makers.11 The difference
between the existing tax system and morality opens a
space that offers many possibilities for action. Thus the
actors involved in the tax system enjoy a certain free-
dom of choice with regard to the design, interpretation,
application and use of tax rules. The choices may affect,
enhance or undermine the integrity of the tax system
vital for a viable society. This means that moral respon-
sibility begins where actions are not completely deter-
mined by the tax law, which is often the case, for free-
dom entails responsibility – taxation being a moral phe-
nomenon.
2.3 Freedom and Responsibility
Freedom and responsibility are interdependent. Persons
are morally responsible for harms (including unjust ben-
efits) they cause, which are seen as blameworthy, or
morally faulty. The wrongdoing causes people to
respond negatively. When a rational person could have
avoided the blameworthy result by making an appropri-
ate choice, this makes him or her responsible. Thus as
Lucas states, responsibility presupposes ‘that there are
agents, that agents act for reasons, and that it is up to an
agent whether he acts or not.’12 Persons may lack the
particular knowledge requisite for doing otherwise, and,
therefore, for being responsible.
10. Cf. B. Gert, Morality: Its Nature and Justification, Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press (1998), at 11. Cf. J.L.M. Gribnau and A.-G. Jallai, ‘Good
Tax Governance and Transparency: A Matter of Ethical Motivation’, TLS
Working Paper, 18 May 2016: 2-3.
11. A.B. Carroll, ‘The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility: Toward
the Moral Management of Organizational Stakeholders’, Business Hori-
zons (July-August 1991) 39-48, at 41.
12. J.R. Lucas, Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1993), at
12.
Besides this ‘cognitive condition’, one may discern the
‘freedom-relevant condition’, for moral responsibility
‘requires the freedom to pursue alternative courses of
action.’13 Not being in control over an action excuses the
person. Moral responsibility presupposes a choice
between two events, both of which one has the power to
bring freely about. Freedom and capability are necessary
for responsibility. ‘But actually having the freedom and
capability to do something does impose on the person
the duty to consider whether or not to do it, and this
does involve personal responsibility.’14 Responsible
behaviour then is behaviour that takes into account the
interests of others trying to avoid bringing (dispropor-
tionate) harm to others. Clearly, without any reasonable
excuse disproportionately impacting or violating the
interests of others amounts to irresponsible behaviour.
To my mind, there is a bandwidth between perfectly
responsible behaviour and clearly irresponsible behav-
iour. Reasonable people may disagree on the qualifica-
tion of behaviour within a certain range. However, there
will be a general consensus that behaviour crossing a
certain lower limit must be qualified as irresponsible.
This is for example the case when a company’s aggres-
sive tax strategy policy is completely disembedded from
the general business strategy, turning the tax depart-
ment into a profit centre.
Are multinational corporations different from individu-
als in this respect? In other words, is responsibility
restricted to human being rather than legal actors? I will
come back to this question in Section 5.
2.4 Tax: Shared Responsibility
This idea of moral responsibility can be applied to fiscal
actors. Legislatures have a certain freedom to choose for
which policies they want to use the tax system. They
make up their minds in a deliberative process. Of
course, they should not violate human rights and respect
international treaties. However, in many areas they
enjoy much freedom to design the tax system according
to their (policy) ends. The European Court of Justice,
for example, leaves legislatures a wide margin of appre-
ciation when testing (technical aspects of) tax statutes
against the principle of equality.15 Tax legislation leaves
tax administrations a certain freedom. Tax administra-
tions face choices when interpreting the tax law and
enjoy discretion with regard to the way the tax law is
enforced.16 The same goes – mutatis mutandis – for tax
courts supervising the tax administrations and checking
the legislative power. With regard to (corporate) taxpay-
13. J.M. Fischer and M. Ravizza (ed.), Perspectives on Moral Responsibility,
Ithaca (NY): Cornell University Press (1993), at 8.
14. A. Sen, Development as Freedom, New York (NY): Alfred A. Knopf
(2000), at 284.
15. ECtHR 22 June 1999, Appl. No. 46757/99, Della Ciaja/Italy, BNB
2002/398, Cf. J.L.M. Gribnau, ‘Equality, Legal Certainty and Tax Legis-
lation in the Netherlands: Fundamental Legal Principles as Checks on
Legislative Power: A Case Study’, 9 Utrecht Law Review 2 (2013), at
64; <http:// papers. ssrn. com/ sol3/ papers. cfm ?abstract_ id= 2244793>.
16. Cf. H. Gribnau, ‘Horizontal Monitoring: Some Procedural Tax Law
Issues’, in R. Russo (ed.), Tax Assurance, Deventer: Kluwer (2015), at
194-5.
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ers, as stated earlier, tax rules are in many ways indeter-
minate and therefore a matter of choice within the
boundaries of the law (see Section 6.5). Especially mul-
tinational corporations enjoy much freedom in this
respect. The behaviour of all these actors has an impact
on the financial resources of the state sustaining society
and the way in which the tax burden is spread over the
citizens (distributive justice).
All these actors, legislatures, courts, tax administrations
and taxpayers, enjoy a degree of freedom and thus can
be held responsible for the integrity of the tax system.
This integrity is a matter of shared responsibility. Of
course, the primary responsibility lies with the state(s),
i.e. the legislature(s), for in a democratic state the legis-
lature represents the people, thus being authorised to set
the rules of the game. Their responsibility is to establish
fair and effective legislation. It is up to the tax authori-
ties to apply and enforce the tax rules set by the legisla-
ture. The courts provide legal protection to taxpayers in
case of tax disputes – an essential part of any integer tax
system. And last but not least, taxpayers bear responsi-
bility for integrity of their tax systems. If they evade or
completely minimise their tax payments, government
would lack the financial means essential to sustaining
society and thus society would be at risk. Though the
law should be equally applied to all; some taxpayers
manage to escape their obligations by searching every
nook and cranny of the tax system. Thus, for some (cor-
porate) taxpayers to pay taxes becomes a matter of
choice. This may have dire consequences, as Williams
observes: ‘If the system is seen by the general populace
as to some extent optional, and open to “abuse” by those
who can afford to pay for sophisticated tax advice, then
this may engender social discord and discourage compli-
ance by other taxpayers.’17
To conclude, the integrity of the tax system is a matter
of shared responsibility, even though it is asymmetric.
The fact that the legislature has to advance the general
interest, whereas taxpayers may advance their own
interests, accounts for this normative asymmetry. In the
following sections, I will deal with the way tax legisla-
ture(s) and (corporate) taxpayers – and their tax advisers
– handle their responsibility for the integrity of the tax
system.
3 States and Their
Responsibility
3.1 Introduction
As stated earlier, the legislature had the primary respon-
sibility to establish a fair and effective system of taxa-
tion. The legislature sets out the total amount of tax to
be paid by the members of society, and allocates the
payments to the members of society. Hence, the legisla-
ture must determine the fair share taxpayers have to
17. D.F. Williams, Tax and Corporate Social Responsibility (2007), at 4;
<www. kpmg. co. uk/ pubs/ Tax_ and_ CSR_ Final. pdf>.
contribute. However, once the legislature has created
this legal obligation and translated in legal written rules,
the rules will inevitably appear to be imperfect, ambigu-
ous, lagging behind societal, economic and technical
developments and taxpayers’ undesirable use of legisla-
tion,18 and so on. The letter of the law may diverge from
the spirit of the law.19 The legislature, of course, has the
primary responsibility for narrowing the gap between
the letter of the law and the spirit of the law. With
regard to the international taxation, states should coop-
erate to restore the integrity of the international tax sys-
tem.20
Tax legislation should be based on an impartial balanc-
ing of the different interests involved. The legislative
process should be transparent and unbiased. Interests-
groups lobbying for favourable tax rules are influential
actors in the decision-making process. Corporate lobby-
ing is often very effective, which may result in tax privi-
leges at the expense of other taxpayers. The prevailing
political view on taxation as a regulatory tool, to realise
all kind of policy goals, increases the risk of the intro-
duction of privileges – to the prejudice of the integrity
of the tax system. The tax system thus stimulates the
adoption of a calculating attitude in which rules are seen
as opportunities to pay less tax. An ethical attitude,
which sees paying tax as contributing to the sustenance
of society in a fair way shared by all, is crowded out.
States also use tax vying with each other for investments
that companies make within their jurisdiction. They
expect that these investments will generate employment
and tax revenues.21 Tax competition has become part
and parcel of this regulatory competition. Governments
competing for investment take into account the interests
of multinational corporations (MNCs) trying to meet
their demand for favourable tax rules. Harmful compe-
tition results in very favourable tax regimes for corpo-
rate taxpayers – shifting the tax burden to other taxpay-
ers. Again a rule-focus is created: tax rules are seen as
instruments to lower corporation’ tax liability. With
regard to international taxation, states should therefore
18. Cf. OECD, Study into the Role of Tax Intermediaries, Paris: OECD
(2008), at 87: ‘the often lengthy period between the time schemes are
created and sold and the time revenue bodies discover them and reme-
dial legislation is enacted.’
19. Here I use the term ‘letter of the law’ as shorthand with regard to tax
planning that exploits the technicalities or differences between tax sys-
tems by making use of ‘a bewildering variety of techniques (e.g. multi-
ple deductions of the same loss, double-dip leases, mismatch arrange-
ments, loss-making financial assets artificially allocated to high-tax juris-
dictions)’; P. Piantavigna, ‘Tax Abuse and Aggressive Tax Planning in
the BEPS Era: How EU Law and the OECD Are Establishing a Unifying
Conceptual Framework in International Tax Law, Despite Linguistic Dis-
crepancies’, 9 World Tax Journal 1 (2017), 47-98, at 52.
20. Cf. J. Freedman, ‘The Tax Avoidance Culture: Who is Responsible?
Governmental Influences and Corporate Social Responsibility’, in J.
Holder and C. O’Cinneide (eds.), Current Legal Problems, New York
(NY): Oxford University Press (2006), at 387: ‘Government has a
responsibility to create the right conditions and culture for a generally
tax-compliant system which would benefit the entire legitimate business
community in keeping costs down and spreading tax burdens fairly.’
21. Cf. M. Koenig-Archibugi, ‘Global Regulation’, in R. Baldwin, M. Cave &
M. Lodge (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Regulation, Oxford: Oxford
University Press (2010), at 413-16.
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cooperate to restore the integrity of the international tax
system.
3.2 Tax Legislation Too Responsive to Business
Interests
3.2.1 Tax Lobbying
Legislative decision-making requires a non-partisan and
impartial attitude on the part of the legislatures. Com-
peting interests should therefore be balanced in a rea-
sonable way in order to uphold the integrity of the tax
system. However, often, the legislature is too responsive
to private or interest-group pressure resulting in legisla-
tion lacking impartiality.22
This already was one of Adam Smith’s concerns: ‘The
cruellest of our revenue laws, I will venture to affirm,
are mild and gentle, in comparison of some of those
which the clamour of our merchants and manufacturers
has extorted from the legislature.’23 The economist Wal-
ter Bagehot elucidated this concern at the centenary of
Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations. The European
governments of the time consulted producers. ‘But,
unhappily, the producer was just the wrong person to
consult. What he wanted was a high price for his article,
and a monopoly of the market in which to sell it, and the
laws he recommended were inevitably framed, more or
less, to obtain his wishes.’ Consequently, these laws
worked badly, because they were framed in the wrong
person’s interest. In this way, ‘the cat had the custody of
the cream.’24
Consultation is one thing, (actively) lobbying another.
Lobbying is the presentation of group’s point of view
and usually aimed at getting the group’s perspective
across the legislators and influencing legislative deci-
sions, i.e. to vote their way. They can play a positive
role by supplying information to the legislators who
then have to assess the credibility of information and
cross-check it with information supplied by other lobby-
ists or interest groups. ‘Lobbyists provide policymakers
with research, draft-legislation and pass up-to-the-
22. Tax advisors and their professional organisations often advise the legis-
lature on technical issues in drafting legislation. According to the UK
Public Accounts Committee this may give rise ‘to a perception that they
have an influence on the formulation of tax policy that smaller business-
es do not have.’ Though this assistance may improve the quality of tax
legislation, the Committee is ‘concerned that the very people who pro-
vide this advice then go on to advise their clients how to use those laws
to avoid tax; The (UK) House of Commons, Committee of Public
Accounts, Tax Avoidance: The Role of Large Accountancy Firms, Forty-
fourth Report of Session 2012-13 Report, together with formal minutes,
oral and written evidence, London: The Stationery Office Limited
(2013), at 5.
23. A. Smith, An Inquiry in the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of
Nations [1776], Indianapolis (IN): Liberty Fund (1981) IV.viii.4, at 648.
Cf. A. Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, Indianapolis (IN): Liberty Fund
(1982), at 529.
24. R. Dudley Edwards (ed.), The Best of Bagehot, London: Hamish Hamil-
ton (1993), at 37-8.
minute information.’25 By way of lobbying corporations
participate in the public policy making process. This
kind of corporate political activity is part of the demo-
cratic ‘engagement of individuals – and groups of indi-
viduals such as corporations – in the full and free
expression of their views on matters of public policy’.26
Lobbyists induce public officials and legislators to adopt
a particular position on an issue that benefits business.
Business lobbyists will also try to draft legislation con-
taining tax breaks, tax incentives and the like. However,
everyday lobbying methods may amount to ‘pressure
tactics’.27
Thus, the democratic legitimacy of tax laws is at risk,
for as Piketty argues: ‘No one has the right to set his
own tax rates.’28 Influential interest groups, however,
may hijack the legislative process to advance their own
interests at the expense the general interest. Powerful
lobbies may obtain privileges to the detriment of the
integrity of the tax system.
3.2.2 The Visible Hand and Corporate Tax Privileges
Corporations are among the most influential lobbyists.
Asymmetry of money and expertise enables business
lobbyists to influence much of the legislative agenda.
Political philosopher Wolin even argues that ‘in matters
of public policy and governmental decision-making,
(corporate) lobbying demonstrates how little the actions
of the electorate matter’.29 The notion that business and
government are partners, sharing the same mission,
threatens governments’ sovereignty over corporations
for the latter ‘stand next to, rather than under democrat-
ic governments’.30 Just as Adam Smith warned that con-
sultation may result in laws working ill, lobbying by the
25. J. Madrick, ‘How the Lobbyists Win in Washington’, New York Review
of Books (7 April 2016), at 50. He quotes Hall and Deardorff: ‘Legisla-
tors…work hard primarily on behalf of the interests that can afford the
high costs, not only of organizing and making campaign contributions,
but of paying professional lobbyists and financing the organizations that
support them.’
26. A. Stark, ‘Business in Politics: Lobbying and Corporate Campaign Con-
tributions’, in G.G. Brenkert and T.L. Beauchamp (eds.), The Oxford
Handbook of Business Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2009),
at 501. Stark discusses the conflict between two ethical principles which
should govern corporate political activity: government in which public
officials are free from corruption, on the one hand, and robust political
engagement of individuals and organisations, on the other.
27. W.N. Eskridge, P.P. Frickey & E. Garrett, Legislation: Statutes and the
Creation of Public Policy, St. Paul (MN): West Publishing Company
(2001), at 285-7. Cf. the warning issued by the Business Roundtable on
behalf of 185 chief executives that the EU and its people risk a ‘grievous
self-inflicted wound’ after the European Commission’s ruling that Apple
must pay back Ireland €13bn in taxes <http:// businessroundtable. org/
resources/ business -roundtable -letter -eu -heads -state -or -government -
regarding -state -aid -investigations>; see ‘Apple tax ruling must be over-
turned, says US business group’, The Guardian, 16 September 2016. A.
Christians, ‘Friends with Tax Benefits: Apple’s Cautionary Tale’, 78 Tax
Notes International (2015) 11 argues that this ‘fiscal state aid’ ruling ‘is
fundamentally an interrogation into what, if anything, governments can
or should do to stop the strategic use of national tax systems to lure
international trade and investment.’
28. Piketty, above n. 4, at 522.
29. S.S. Wolin, Democracy Incorporated: Managed Democracy and the
Specter of Inverted Totalitarianism, Princeton (NJ) / Oxford: Princeton
University Press (2008), at 194.
30. J. Bakan, The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Power, London:
Constable (2005), at 108.
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modern globalising corporation will result in laws ‘inevi-
tably framed, more or less, to obtain his wishes’. As a
result it is not the ‘invisible hand’ that guides the indi-
vidual selfish actor ‘to promote an end which was no
part of his intention’, as Adam Smith might seem to
suggest.31 On the contrary, it is the state’s hand very
effectively guided by corporate lobbying. In both inter-
national and national settings, business can thus ‘influ-
ence both the substance of law and how it is enforced
through lobbying and negotiating, introducing compro-
mise and weakening control’.32 Pressure from business
(and wealthy citizens) and international (tax) competi-
tion has placed pressure on public services and govern-
ments’ capacity to regulate business activities.33 More-
over, large corporations are often able to outsource risks
as for example state support of banks in the wake of the
financial crisis has shown. This boils down to corpora-
tions ‘demanding the socialization of their risks, so that
public taxpayers can pay the costs of their business fias-
cos’.34
The serious effects on society of corporate lobbying and
shaping government policy builds on the fact that most
Western states use their extensive powers to promote
and protect people’s welfare.35 Indeed, government does
more than creating trust on which market transactions
depend by legal enforcement of contracts and (intellec-
tual) property rights. The state is not merely fixing mar-
ket failures – reigning monopolies, subsidising public
goods, taxing negative externalities (through investment
in education and infrastructure), etc. – so as to enable
market forces to efficiently allocate resources. The state
does even more than playing an active role in managing
markets. The ‘state’s very visible hand’ takes on risk,
shaping and creating new markets, as the economist
Mazzucato maintains, ‘the state is a lead risk taker and
31. Smith (1981), above n. 23, I, ii,12, at 26-7 and IV, ii,9, at 456 and A.
Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments [1759], Indianapolis (IN): Liber-
ty Fund (1976), IV.i.10, at 184-5. The metaphor of the invisible hand
reflects the idea of providence as a secular translation of God’s will;
N.O. Keohane, Philosophy and the State in France: The Renaissance to
the Enlightenment, Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press (1980), at
354.
32. D.J. McBarnet, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility Beyond Law, Through
Law, For Law: The New Corporate Accountability’, in D.J. McBarnet, A.
Voiculescu & T. Campbell (eds.), The New Corporate Accountability:
Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press (2007), at 45.
33. D. Tapscott and D. Ticoll, The Naked Corporation: How the Age of
Transparency Will Revolutionize Business, Toronto: Penguin Canada
(2004), at 184. Thus ‘many governments have willingly ceded power to
free markets.’
34. B. Barber, Jihad vs McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism are
Reshaping the World, New York (NY): Ballantine Books (1996), at 28.
35. This goes also for the United States, often represented as a country with
a history of minimum government. This however, ‘requires considerable
imagination’; J. Gray, False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism,
London: Granta (1998), at 105. S. Pincus, The Heart of the Declaration:
The Founders’ Case for an Activist Government, New Haven (CT) /
London: Yale University Press (2016), argues that the authors of the
American Declaration of Independence already advocated a political
programme for state-driven economic and social development. The
Declaration was ‘a call for the creation of a powerful state that would
actively promote the welfare of the people’ (at 134) – paid for by high
(progressive) taxes.
market shaper’.36 She shows for example that without
decades of research efforts and funding support of the
federal government, there would not have products like
the iPad and iPhone. ‘Apple has mastered designing and
engineering technologies that were first developed and
funded by the U.S. government and military.’37 Of
course, the state is expected to receive a return on
investments by taxing the resulting profits. However,
corporations’ aggressive tax planning frustrates this
expectation.
The active role of the state, guided by corporate lobby-
ing, includes legislating generous tax incentives, for
example to foster innovation (R&D). Business lobbying
for creating and preserving expenditures in the form of
tax exemptions is often very effective. As a result, ‘the
actual hand of government distributes corporate subsi-
dies, tax breaks and the like’.38 These tax privileges are
the result of unchecked political bargaining power.
Hence, as Wolin argues: ‘Arguments about taxation are,
at bottom, arguments about the distribution of power.’39
Consequently, lobbying erodes a level playing field, a
necessary condition for fair competition. Hence, such
tax privileges (tax breaks) are sometimes introduced that
violate the principle of equality. These kinds of privileg-
es, which are obvious violations of the impartiality
requirement, can be labelled ‘naked preferences’: the
distribution of resources or opportunities to one group
rather than to another solely on the ground that ‘those
favored have exercised the raw political power to obtain
what they want’.40 This lack of legislative impartiality
goes at the cost of the principle of equality.
In short, tax policy appears to respond primarily to
those with the resources to influence the policy makers.
This applies to political decision-making with regard to
taxation at a domestic as well as an international level.
Critical scholars such as Christians argue that the sys-
tem becomes increasingly unresponsive to legitimate
policy goals and increasingly out of touch with justice.
‘Special interests consistently exert influence on tax pol-
icy discourse through their advisors and within a broad
36. M. Mazzucato, The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs. Private
Sector Myths, New York (NY): Public Affairs Books (2015), at 17.
37. Mazzucato, above n. 36, at 99.
38. Wolin, above n. 29, at 123. Cf. R.R. Reich, Supercapitalism. The Trans-
formation of Business, Democracy, and Everyday Life, New York (NY):
Knopf (2007), at 207: ‘regulations, subsidies, and tax breaks are justi-
fied as being in the “public interest” but are most often the products of
fierce lobbying by businesses or industries seeking competitive advant-
age over one another.’
39. Wolin, above n. 29, at 56. For the influence of Labour-party donors and
business owners on Labour’s policy with regard to tax breaks, see R.
Brooks, The Great Tax Robbery: How Britain Became a Tax Haven for
Fat Cats and Big Business, London: Oneworld Publications (2013), at
165-6.
40. C.R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, Cambridge (MA) / London:
Harvard University Press (1993), at 25 and ‘Equality, Consistency, and
Impartiality in Tax Legislation’, in J.L.M. Gribnau (ed.), Legal Protection
against Discriminatory Tax Legislation, The Hague [etc.]: Kluwer Law
International (2003), at 7-32.
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spectrum of discrete and pooled capacities.’41 Christians
argues that this is a governance problem, which must
systematically be addressed in order to restore taxpayer
trust. To her, transparency and accountability in policy
making are part of the solution.
3.3 Tax Reduced to Regulatory Instrument
The primary function of taxation is to raise revenue for
necessary governmental functions, such as the provision
of public goods and services enabling society and mar-
kets to flourish. Second, there is the redistributive func-
tion, which is aimed at reducing the unequal distribu-
tion of income and wealth in order to enhance distribu-
tive justice. However, these two functions seem to be
overshadowed by the instrumental or regulatory func-
tion, for politicians also see taxes as a potential regulato-
ry tool. As Avi-Yonah writes, this third goal of taxation
is ‘regulation of private sector activity by rewarding
activities that are considered desirable (via deductions or
credits) and deterring activities that are considered
undesirable (via increased taxation).’42
In order to promote desirable behaviour to advance all
kinds of economic, social, cultural and health policy
goals, governments provide tax incentives, micromanag-
ing the choices of taxpayer. Dutch tax law is notorious
for its incentives (tax expenditures), mostly in the form
of tax reductions, e.g. for commuting by bike, employ-
ee’s training, day-care centres, production of Dutch
movies, research and development, ecologically sound
investments or the letting of rooms by private persons.
These tax incentives are deliberately introduced to stim-
ulate taxpayers to act in a way that actually means pay-
ing less (or not more) tax. Tax increases and special lev-
ies provide disincentives to discourage taxpayers from
engaging in practices deemed undesirable, such as
smoking, alcohol consumption or environmentally pol-
luting activities. Examples of disincentives employed
include excises and environmental taxes.
Taxation is thus an overly cherished instrument in gov-
ernments’ regulatory tool kit. The regulatory function is
too frequently favoured thereby shirking the responsi-
bility for the distributive justice and fairness of the tax
system. However, there are other consequences that
should also be of serious concern.
41. A. Christians, ‘Trust in the Tax System: The Problem of Lobbying’, in
Peeters, Gribnau & Badisco, above n. 5, at 152. To her mind govern-
ments should move towards achieving these aims by supporting and
contributing to global, open-access data resources and independent tax
policy research in the public interest.
42. R.S. Avi-Yonah, ‘The Three Goals of Taxation’, 60 Tax Law Review 1
(2006-2007), at 23. The regulatory function may of course impair the
other functions.
4 Effects of Irresponsible Tax
Legislative Behaviour
4.1 Erosion of Internal Morality
The upshot of the instrumentalist attitude of the tax
legislature is that taxpayers, citizens and business alike,
are incentivised to take a calculating attitude towards
tax.43 They are seduced to mitigate their tax by carefully
attuning their behaviour to the financial impact of
(encouraging or discouraging) tax provisions – and in
doing so to the legislature’s ends. Thus the legislature
creates a good deal of tax planning. De Colle and Ben-
nett aptly call this state-induced tax planning. ‘Citizens,
small entrepreneurs and MNEs can avail of these tax
benefits in the knowledge that they are not only legal,
but actually welcomed by tax authorities, as they are in
fact introduced by a legislative body.’44 The legislature
wishes them to behave in a certain way and this behav-
iour is rewarded with a lower tax liability. Thus, busi-
nesses may have a low effective tax rate because they
make use of tax incentives (e.g. for R&D). However,
measures promoting research and development (and
innovation) may imply a risk of profit shifting for intan-
gibles are highly mobile and can be easily be transferred
from one country to another.45 Moreover, sometimes
tax legislation incentivises the use of devices that are
highly artificial – ‘encouraging a culture of tax avoid-
ance’.46 Thus, legislatures fuel ‘the growth of tax avoid-
ance culture by relying on the taxation system to deliver
a variety of tax unrelated subsidies and economic stimuli
and (…) to drive social policy’.47
Businesses can also engage in aggressive tax planning by
exploiting the letter of the law or loopholes in tax incen-
tives. Thus they re-engineer tax incentives for tax
avoidance. Of course, not only businesses but also weal-
thy taxpayers deploy sophisticated techniques to exploit
never intended tax breaks, exemptions, etc.48
This state-induced tax planning may not live up to the
legislature’s intentions for taxpayers may overreact and
43. H. Gribnau, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Planning: Not by
Rules Alone’, 24 Social & Legal Studies 2 (2015a), at 230-31; <http://
papers. ssrn. com/ sol3/ papers. cfm ?abstract_ id= 2610090>.
44. S. de Colle and A.M. Bennett, ‘State-induced, Strategic, or Toxic? An
Ethical Analysis of Tax Avoidance Practices’, Business & Professional
Ethics Journal 33 (2014) 1, at 53-82 (§ 3.1).
45. E. Gil Garcia, ‘The Effect of Anti-Avoidance Provisions Regarding the
Promotion of Innovation: Considerations from a Tax Policy Perspective’,
Bulletin for International Taxation (October 2016), at 583. Bearing in
mind that R&D (&I) schemes and intellectual property regimes may give
rise to a risk of base erosion and profit shifting she explores the differ-
ent possibilities that are used to counter tax avoidance and aggressive
tax planning, and noting their effect on fiscal measures that are
designed to encourage technological innovation.
46. Freedman (2006), above n. 20, at 371.
47. H. Ordower, ‘The Culture of Tax Avoidance’, Saint Louis University
School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2010-06, at 6.
48. For schemes devised as ‘a smoke screen for additional remuneration’ for
foreign football players in the UK, see Brooks, above n. 39. He con-
cludes, that as a result of this level playing field ‘British youngsters
struggle to find places at the top level and the national team plumbs
new depths of under-achievement’ (at 154). He labels this as ‘reverse
protectionism’ (at 162).
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underreact to new tax incentives due to, e.g. tax com-
plexity and cognitive ability.49 Overreaction, for exam-
ple, may have far too big an impact on the treasury. The
legislature often underestimates this budgetary impact
and therefore often reacts by changing the tax provi-
sions containing the ‘overused’ incentive in order to
diminish the budgetary impact. Thus the legislature is
permanently looking for optimisation of the use of the
tax instrument. Benefits and costs are calculated, and
rules deliberately designed and redesigned to influence
taxpayer’s behaviour.
The widespread use of – often fiercely lobbied for – tax
incentives is one of the major reasons for the ever-grow-
ing complexity of the tax system. Complexity goes at the
expense of predictability. But also consistency in time is
seriously lacking because of the all too frequent changes
made by the legislature.50 Thus legal certainty is seri-
ously eroded, resulting in lower levels of compliance
(sometimes uncertainty is even deliberately created to
put off taxpayers).51 Furthermore, important values
such as consistency and transparency are treated in a
stepmotherly way. Moreover, equality is at risk, for
many taxpayers do not have the expertise to deal with
tax complexity, which may negatively impact taxpayers’
perception of the distributive justice and fairness of the
existing tax system.
Thus, the result of this feverish and instrumentalist leg-
islative activity is that tax legislation regularly violates
important legal values and principles, such as legal cer-
tainty, equality, neutrality and consistency. To my
mind, the tax legislature would do well to show more
respect for legal principles, for they constitute the
‘internal morality of law’.52
Legal principles are internal standards generated and
developed by the legal system itself – although they are
strongly influenced by (external) morality. They are
thus intimately connected to society’s moral values, and
society’s views on the integrity of the tax system.53 Leg-
islation that shows disdain for important legal and soci-
etal values does not command respect. Eroding the
internal morality of the law may chip away at tax legisla-
ture’s legitimacy, and may produce taxpayers’ decreas-
ing compliance.
4.2 Crowding Out Ethics
As argued earlier, fundamental legal-ethical principles
may be crowded out in the taxpayers’ decision-making
process, such as the principle of equality and the ability-
to-pay principle. These principles are enshrined in the
49. J. Abeler and S. Jäger, ‘Complex Tax Incentives: An Experimental Inves-
tigation’, CESifo Working Paper No. 4231, 2013.
50. S. Steinmo, ‘The Evolution of Policy Ideas: Tax Policy in the 20th Centu-
ry’, 2 British Journal of Politics and International Relations (5 May
2003), at 218.
51. Empirical research has found that continuous changes and complexity in
tax law have a negative effect on the level of compliance; E. Kirchler,
The Economic Psychology of Tax Behaviour, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press (2007), at 39.
52. Fuller, above n. 6, at 200-24.
53. H. Gribnau, ‘Not Argued From But Prayed To. Who’s Afraid of Legal
Principles?’, 12 eJournal of Tax Research 1 (2014), at 203-6.
law, both for the legislature and for the taxpayer. Many
tax provisions, however, establish a rule-based context
to encourage and even control the behaviour of the tax-
payers and the taxpayers will play with the rules. The
focus of both legislature and taxpayer is on rules, not on
ethical behaviour.
As a result, a dominantly rule-bound regulatory and
compliance focus is likely to undermine a more princi-
ple-based ethical thinking. This may cause both actors
to (consciously) ignore tougher issues that a more eth-
ics-focused approach might demand.54 Moreover, not
only actual ethical thinking is undermined, but even the
intrinsic motivation to take into account ethical consid-
erations to comply with the law.55
Taxpayers’ tendency of viewing and using tax laws in a
mechanistic, rule-based way is reinforced by the com-
plexity and lack of transparency of the law. The result-
ing uncertainty about their legal rights and responsibili-
ties incites taxpayers to carefully study the rules to
improve certainty of their tax position and looking for
opportunities to mitigate and even avoid paying their
taxes.
In short, tax legislatures and taxpayers share a focus on
rules. This mindset prevails in the interaction of these
two fiscal actors. Tax statutes establish a rule-based
context to control the behaviour of taxpayers and tax-
payers will work around and play around with the exist-
ing rules.
5 International Tax
Competition and
Cooperation
5.1 Tax Competition: Narrow Self-interest vs.
Responsibility
At an international level taxes are also used as policy
instrument. Again, the state’s hand is very effectively
guided by intense corporate lobby activity with the aim
of ‘suspending competition between companies by incit-
ing competition between locations competing for loca-
tions’.56 Consequently, states use tax legislation to main-
tain and increase investment that companies make,
which is expected to generate employment and tax reve-
nues. In this way, states competing for investment take
into account the interests of MNCs trying to meet their
demand for favourable tax rules (in the lexicon, states
and thus societies ‘become indistinguishable from cor-
54. R.E. Berenbeim and J.M. Kaplan, The Convergence of Principle- and
Rule-Based Ethics Programs: An Emerging Trend, The Conference
Board, Executive Action Series (2007) 3.
55. B.S. Frey and R. Jegen, ‘Motivation Crowding Theory’, 15 Journal of
Economic Surveys 5 (2002), at 594-5.
56. W. Streeck, Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism,
(2nd edition), London: Verso (2017), at xvi.
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porations’57). As a result ‘the tax law market’ organised
by competition has increasingly affected the state and
the choice of its tax policy. Such choices might regard
the effective tax rates, the statutory tax rates or the tax
structure as a whole.58 This specific kind of regulatory
competition capitalizes on and reinforces businesses’
leaning towards tax planning. International tax competi-
tion is thus an important cause of the ever-growing
complexity of tax rules, which leads to higher compli-
ance costs for multinational corporations and the need
for tax planning.
Corporations commonly do not object to this tax com-
petition when it means low (effective) tax rates or other
kinds of favourable treatment. Indeed, business lobby-
ists try to influence (domestic) tax regimes, and some-
times business leaders feel no qualms about point blank
threatening (the leaders of) countries with ‘adverse
effect on foreign investment’.59 This shows that the
instrumental use of taxation has a hotly debated interna-
tional component. As a result there is a fierce tax com-
petition among states, a form of regulatory competition.
The tax legislature seduces taxpayers to behave accord-
ing to his ends and thus creates a good deal of tax plan-
ning. The tax legislature itself is strongly encouraged by
business interests.
One of the hallmarks of globalisation is the increased
mobility of undertakings and especially capital invest-
ments. Companies and entrepreneurs have to compete
on a global scale and accordingly consider low tax costs
an important factor in deciding where to set up under-
takings and invest capital. States respond to this
increased mobility. Many states try to compete with
their tax system in order to attract economic activities
from other states. States see corporation tax as an
important instrument in this bid for economic activity;
for example, lower corporate taxes might induce multi-
national corporations not to allocate their profits to oth-
er countries.60
57. M. Dobbin, The Myth of the Good Corporate Citizen: Democracy
under the Rule of Business, Toronto / New York (NY): Stoddart (1998),
at 2. Cf. C. Derber, Corporation Nation: How Corporations Are Taking
Over Our Lives and What We Can Do About It, New York (NY): St
Martins Press (1998), at 45: ‘Today, global companies pit entire nations
against each other, putting overwhelming pressure on unions around
the worlds to agree cuts in wages and benefits, and on governments to
agree to cuts in corporate regulations and taxes.’
58. C. Peters, On the Legitimacy of International Tax Law, Amsterdam:
IBFD (2014), at 55. International tax competition thus contributes to
the transformation of the tax state to the debt state – that is, ‘a state
which covers a large, possibly rising part, of its expenditure through
borrowing rather than taxation, thereby accumulating a debt mountain
that is has to finance with an ever greater share of its revenue’; Streeck,
above n. 56, at 72-3. He subsequently points at the impact of this
transformation on distribution – favouring affluent citizens.
59. ‘Apple tax ruling must be overturned, says US business group’, The
Guardian, 16 September 2016 <https:// www. theguardian. com/
business/ 2016/ sep/ 16/ apple -tax -ruling -must -be -overturned -says -us -
business -group>. A true business leader might call this ‘political crap.’
60. M. de Wilde, ‘Tax Competition within the European Union – Is the
CCCTB Directive a Solution?’, ELR (May 2014) No. 1, at 25-8. For an
in-depth study of the political dimension of corporation tax issues, see J.
Snape, The Political Economy of Corporation Tax: Theory, Values and
Law Reform, Oxford / Portland: Hart Publishing (2011).
This international tax competition forces national gov-
ernments to search for an optimal mix of public goods
and services on the one hand, and low tax costs on the
other. Of course, such policy competition between
national tax systems may lead to budgetary and tax effi-
ciency, which in principle benefits everyone.61 Nonethe-
less, tax competition may also be economically counter-
productive. Tax incentives commonly used by states in
order to attract investment and capital from abroad can
often have harmful effects. Such special tax schemes as
tax holidays, selective base or rate reductions, and tax
breaks may be designed solely to undercut competition.
Such harmful tax competition is a far cry from tax effi-
ciency and healthy jurisdictional competition, and it
leads to ‘fiscal degradation’ (excessive erosion of coun-
tries’ taxable bases on such income),62 unfair tax advan-
tages for multinational corporations over smaller local
enterprises, over-taxation of labour, and a radical reduc-
tion of public goods and services and negative conse-
quences for distributive justice.63
5.2 OECD
Twenty years ago international organisations became
acutely aware of the dangers of harmful tax competition.
In May 1996, for example the Ministers of the Member
countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) called upon the OECD to
‘develop measures to counter the distorting effects of
harmful tax competition on investment and financing
decisions and the consequences for national tax bases,
and report back in 1998’.64 This request was subse-
quently endorsed by the G7 countries, who pointed to
the fact that globalisation was creating new problems in
the field of tax policy. Tax schemes aimed at attracting
financial and other geographically mobile activities, such
as financial and other service activities, ‘can create
harmful tax competition between States, carrying risks
of distorting trade and investment and could lead to the
erosion of national tax bases’.65
In 1998, the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs pub-
lished a report on harmful tax competition. This report
addressed tax havens and harmful preferential tax
regimes, collectively referred to as harmful tax practices,
in OECD Member countries and non-Member coun-
tries and their dependencies. The OECD report was
intended to develop a better understanding of how these
harmful tax practices ‘affect the location of financial and
other service activities, erode the tax bases of other
countries, distort trade and investment patterns and
undermine the fairness, neutrality and broad social
61. Cf. F. Vanistendael, ‘Fiscal Support Measures and Harmful Tax Compe-
tition’, 9 EC Tax Review 3 (2000), at 152-61.
62. C. Pinto, Tax Competition and EU Law, The Hague / London / New
York (NY): Kluwer Law International (2003), at 11.
63. Cf. A.J. Menéndez, ‘The Purse of the Polity’, in E.O. Eriksen (ed.), Mak-
ing the European Polity: Reflexive Integration in the EU, London: Rout-
ledge (2005), at 208.
64. Committee on Fiscal Affairs OECD, Harmful Tax Competition: A Global
Issue, Paris: OECD (1998), at 8.
65. Communiqué issued by the Heads of State at their 1996 Lyon Summit,
quoted in OECD (1998), above n. 6V4, at 8.
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acceptance of tax systems generally. Such harmful tax
competition diminishes global welfare and undermines
taxpayer confidence in the integrity of tax systems.’66
International cooperation demands that governments
establish a ‘common framework within which countries
could operate individually and collectively to limit the
problems presented by countries and fiscally sovereign
territories engaging in harmful tax practices’.67
Since then important steps have been taken to curb
harmful tax competition – the BEPS-project being the
most recent one. International cooperation to push back
negative externalities is hampered by states’ sovereignty
though. Taxation is at the core of countries’ sovereignty,
but in my view sovereignty should not be exercised in
an irresponsible way, for the interaction of domestic tax
rules sometimes leads to gaps and frictions. ‘When
designing their domestic tax rules, sovereign states may
not sufficiently take into account the effect of other
countries’ rules.’68 Coordination thus requires not to
exercise sovereignty in an irresponsible way.
5.3 EU
In the European Union, an intergovernmental organisa-
tion, harmful tax competition has also been a serious
point of concern for quite a few years.69 A major ach-
ievement was the adoption of a comprehensive package
to tackle harmful tax competition by the ECOFIN
Council on 1 December 1997.70 This package was com-
posed of three linked elements: the Code of Conduct for
Business Taxation, measures to eliminate distortions in
effective taxation of savings income, and measures to
eliminate withholding taxes on cross-border payments
of interest and royalties between associated enterprises.
There is no scientific consensus on the theoretical defi-
nition of harmful tax competition and even ‘empirical
evidence is somewhat disputed by both economists and
political scientists’.71 However, with regard to the Euro-
pean Union (formerly the European Community; EC)
Terra and Wattel argue that tax competition is com-
monly labelled harmful when member states merely
damage each other’s budget, no creation of economic
66. OECD (1998), above n. 64, at 9.
67. OECD (1998), above n. 64, at 8. OECD, Toward Global Tax Coopera-
tion. Progress in Identifying and Eliminating Harmful Tax Practice, Par-
is: OECD (2000) constitutes another fundamental step in OECD’s fight
against harmful tax competition. For recent developments, see M.F.
Nouwen, ‘The European Code of Conduct Group Becomes Increasingly
Important in the Fight against Tax Avoidance: More Openness and
Transparency is Necessary’, 45 Intertax 2 (2017), at 138-49.
68. OECD, BEPS Action Plan, Paris: OECD (2013), at 9.
69. In a subsequent report, the Commission underlined the need for a
group of high representatives of Member States which should achieve
consensus on the tax measures to be considered harmful in the EU con-
text and on the common criteria for the identification with an eye to the
establishment of a ‘code of good conduct.’
70. This package was based on a proposal put forward by the Commission:
see Paper Towards Tax Co-ordination in the European Union – A Pack-
age to Tackle Harmful Tax Competition, COM(97) 495, 1 October
1997, and A Package to Tackle Harmful Tax Competition in the Europe-
an Union, COM(97) 564 final, 5 November 1997. OJ No. C 2, 6 Janu-
ary 1998, at 1.
71. C.M. Radaelli, ‘The Code of Conduct against Harmful Tax Competition:
Open Method of Coordination in Disguise?’, 81 Public Administration
3 (2003), at 522.
activity being at issue, but rather ‘artificial cross-border
shifts of activities (or at least profit-reporting for those
activities), causing a tax loss for the EC as a whole’.72
In subsequent years, many steps have been taken to curb
harmful tax competition. The EU Code of Conduct for
Business Taxation was an early follow up.73 More
recently the European Commission resorted to the EU
State aid provisions and proposed the Common Con-
solidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) of which a re-
launch is currently anticipated. In January 2016 the
Commission published the Anti Tax Avoidance Package
(ATAP).74
5.4 Responsibility: Self-Restraint and
Cooperation
The foregoing shows that harmful tax competition is of
serious concern to states. States thus shows awareness
that their primary responsibility lies with improving the
international tax system. Indeed, cooperation is needed
to avoid suboptimal responses by individual states or
even a race-to-the-bottom.75 States will always be reluc-
tant to act unilaterally for being a first mover may result
in a competitive disadvantage. The European Commis-
sion, for example, recently pointed out that several ‘fea-
tures of the Netherlands’ tax system can be used in
structures for aggressive tax planning’.76 Regulatory
competition is a fact of life. Countries have the right to
compete with each other to attract investments – which
are expected to generate employment and tax revenues.
However, they should exercise self-restraint by taking
into account other countries’ interests. Moreover, coor-
dination is also in their own interest. Sovereign coun-
tries therefore betray their external and internal respon-
sibility if they do not exercise self-constraint.
It is thus to be expected that the ensuing closer coopera-
tion on the international and European level will result
in more responsible law-making and better rules.
OECD’s BEPS project and the European Commission’s
ATAP initiative are creating a minimum standard that
would make it possible to put a halt to excesses of tax
planning. Thus states can be seen as collaboratively
72. B.J.M. Terra and P. Wattel, European Tax Law, Deventer: Kluwer
(2007), at 111.
73. See H. Gribnau, ‘Soft Law and Taxation: EU and International Aspects’,
2008 Legisprudence II/2, at 81-5. <http:// papers. ssrn. com/ sol3/ papers.
cfm ?abstract_ id= 2445018>.
74. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament
and the Council, Anti-Tax Avoidance Package: Next steps towards
delivering effective taxation and greater tax transparency in the EU, 28
January 2016, COM(2016) 23 final; <http:// eur -lex. europa. eu/ legal -
content/ EN/ TXT/ PDF/ ?uri= CELEX: 52016DC0023& from= EN>.
75. Peters, above n. 58, at 58 points at the WTO provisions on subsidies as
the legal framework that is in place to curb harmful tax competition.
76. European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Country
Report The Netherlands 2016 Including An In Depth Review on the
prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, Brussels, 26
February 2016 Swd(2016), at 44. 87 Final; <http:// ec. europa. eu/
europe2020/ pdf/ csr2016/ cr2016_ netherlands_ en. pdf>. In a footnote,
the EC refers to ‘an overview of the most common structures for
aggressive tax planning and the provisions (or lack thereof) necessary
for these structures to work’, viz. Ramboll Management Consulting and
Corit Advisory (2016), ‘Study on Structures of Aggressive Tax Planning
and Indicators’, European Commission Taxation Paper No 61.
21
Hans Gribnau doi: 10.5553/ELR.000082 - ELR August 2017 | No. 1
This article from Erasmus Law Review is published by Eleven international publishing and made available to Universiteit Leiden
engaging in legal engineering in the sense of creating
and improving legal regimes or systems by taking away
inconsistencies and loopholes – ‘for the benefit of soci-
ety as a whole’.77 Consequently, the integrity of the
international tax system will gradually improve. None-
theless, we should not be over-optimistic. A perfect,
seamless international tax system is a utopian dream.
Further improvements are possible, but tax systems by
definition will always be imperfect and incomplete.78
Moreover, mismatches (disparities or legal gaps)
between the tax systems of various states will probably
always exist. And with regard to (tax) treaties, treaty
shopping, taking advantage of treaty rules, is not easily
to be ruled out. The same goes for making use of low-
tax jurisdictions. Therefore, whatever tax rules are in
place, (corporate) taxpayers will always have some
choice with regard to the applicable tax rules and their
interpretation. However, as stated earlier, freedom of
choice entails (moral) responsibility. Using tax rules
therefore is inevitably a matter of exercising responsibil-
ity.
6 (Ir)responsible Corporate
Tax Planning
6.1 Tax Planning: Law and Morality
OECD’s BEPS Project is about tax planning, aggressive
tax planning.79 But what exactly is the phenomenon
called tax planning? Unfortunately, there is no univer-
sally accepted definition of tax planning, nor of aggres-
sive tax planning.
Partly due to the excessive use of tax legislation as a reg-
ulatory instrument, taxation regards almost every aspect
of human life. This may be labelled the ‘fiscalization’ of
our existence. Taxpayers of course want to be in control
of their financial affairs of which their (future) tax liabil-
ity is an important part. Sound decision-making with
regard to important life events, such as where to live and
work, when to retire and where to carry on an enter-
prise, must take potential tax consequences into
account. In one way or another, (corporate) taxpayers
have to plan their tax affairs to plan their life or develop
77. Cf. S. Douma, Legal Research in International and EU Tax Law,
Deventer: Kluwer (2014), at 41. Cf. J. Smits, ‘Legal Engineering in an
Age of Globalisation: Is There a Future for Jurisdictional Competition?’,
in E. Ritaine-Cashin (ed.), Legal Engineering and Comparative Law
tome 2, Genève: Schulthess (2009), 51-7, at 52. To Smits legal engi-
neering as such can be seen ‘as the creation of legal structures that fulfil
particular functional and practical purposes … dealing with specific
social problems by society as a whole’.
78. The international tax regime has become unfair for it is outdated,
flawed, and arbitrary; M.F. de Wilde, ‘“Sharing the Pie” Taxing Multi-
nationals in a Global Market’ (PhD-thesis, Erasmus University Rotter-
dam 2015), at 15. He develops an alternative framework for taxing
multinational business proceeds in a global market.
79. For a critical discussion, see J.M. Calderón Carrero and A. Quintas
Seara, ‘The Concept of “Aggressive Tax Planning” Launched by the
OECD and the EU Commission in the BEPS Era: Redefining the Border
between Legitimate and Illegitimate Tax Planning’, 44 Intertax 3
(2016), at 208-226.
their business strategy. As shown earlier, tax planning is
often deliberately encouraged by tax legislation,
accounting for a dynamic and reciprocal relationship
between tax planning and tax legislation. Of course, not
all tax planning is incentivised this way.
So tax planning is to a certain extent necessary to stay in
control of one’s financial affairs because many (possible)
actions have tax consequences – for example, taking into
account the rules regarding the deductibility of mort-
gage interest when buying a house. In this sense ‘tax
planning’ can be used as a morally neutral term, for tax
planning is aimed at providing certainty with regard to
an important part of our financial affairs. As stated earli-
er, corporate governance may require (corporate) tax
planning in order to avoid double taxation in an interna-
tional context.80 Tax planning may even be aimed at
compensating for unreasonable tax liabilities caused by
arbitrary laws or (corrupt) tax officials – especially in
developing countries.81 Moreover, individuals and busi-
nesses share a tendency to use tax rules to lower their
tax bill.
Hence, some tax planning is a common affair for taxpay-
ers and calling for a nuanced approach. Nearly all tax-
payers are to some extent tax planners, though the
intensity, the aggressiveness of their tax savings activi-
ties, differs. Factors determining tax planning behaviour
are, e.g. the attitude towards tax, opportunities to avoid,
expertise and risk appetite.
Tax planning is thus a very broad term encompassing a
continuum ranging from tax mitigation to aggressive tax
planning (and may be even tax evasion). To conceptual-
ise tax planning in this broad way is necessary because
the conventional distinction made by lawyers between
tax evasion and tax avoidance allows by definition for a
legal rather than a moral evaluation of tax planning
practices. Tax evasion is an illegal activity, involving
intentional non-disclosure or concealment, be it fraudu-
lent or not.82 Taken in its widest sense, the concept of
(legal) tax avoidance comprises ‘all arrangements to
reduce, eliminate or defer a tax liability’.83 A moral eval-
uation of tax planning practices requires broadening the
scope of the concept ‘tax planning’ beyond a purely legal
perspective, for law as a system of codified ethics is part
of the (wider) public morality.
6.2 Tax Planning by Degrees
From a moral perspective, it may be useful to add the
concepts of ‘tax mitigation’ and ‘aggressive tax planning’
to the legal concepts of ‘tax evasion’ and ‘tax avoidance’.
Mitigation is aimed at lowering ‘one’s tax by adopting
patterns of economic behaviour that are within the spirit
of applicable tax legislation and that may even be
80. R. Russo and J. van Trigt, ‘Corporate Governance and Taxes’, in R. Rus-
so (ed.), Tax Assurance, Deventer: Wolters Kluwer (2015), at 39.
81. VBDO, Tax Transparency Benchmark 2015, Utrecht: VBDO (2015), at
11; <www. vbdo. nl>.
82. J. Hasseldine and G. Morris, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax
Avoidance: A Comment and Reflection’, 37 Accounting Forum (2013)
1-14, at 5.
83. J. Freedman, ‘Defining Taxpayer Responsibility: In Support of a General
Anti-Avoidance Principle’, 4 British Tax Review (2004), at 335-6.
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encouraged by government policy’.84 It is not a term of
art from a legal perspective, as Prebble and Prebble
rightly state. It can be taken to mean ‘reducing one’s tax
in ways that a governing statute clearly encourages or
permits; for example, taking a deduction for a gift to
charity’.85
Aggressive tax planning, on the other hand, is not a
rather innocent affair. The European Commission
defines aggressive tax planning as ‘taking advantage of
the technicalities of a tax system or of mismatches
between two or more tax systems for the purpose of
reducing tax liability’.86 According to the OECD,
aggressive tax planning involves ‘a tax position that is
tenable but has unintended and unexpected tax revenue
consequences’. Thus, according to the OECD, ‘tax leg-
islation can be misused to achieve results which were
not foreseen by the legislators’.87 Such a position on tax
is taken ‘without openly disclosing that there is uncer-
tainty whether significant matters in the tax return
accord with the law’. It is added that ‘sometimes, reve-
nue bodies would not even agree that the law is in
doubt’.88 The adjective ‘aggressive’ reflects the
‘acknowledgment that MNEs’ tax avoidance strategies
have become more and more sophisticated, pushing the
boundaries of the legislation and exploiting any loop-
holes in tax laws’.89 They thus engage in quite an
extreme form of legal engineering (or ‘creative lawyer-
ing’): ‘the inconsistencies and loopholes of legal systems
are exploited to provide perfectly legal benefits’.90 The
phenomenon of ‘stateless income’ is a well-known
example of aggressive tax planning. Kleinbard describes
it
as income derived for tax purposes by a multinational
group from business activities in a country other than
the domicile of the group’s ultimate parent company
but which is subject to tax only in a jurisdiction that
is neither the source of the factors of production
84. Z.M. Prebble and J. Prebble, ‘The Morality of Tax Avoidance’, 43
Creighton Law Review 3 (2010), at 707.
85. R. Prebble and J. Prebble, ‘Does the Use of General Anti-Avoidance
Rules to Combat Tax Avoidance Breach Principles of the Rule of Law? A
Comparative Study’, 55 Saint Louis University Law Journal (2010), 21,
at 22; <www. slu. edu/ Documents/ law/ Law%20Journal/ Archives/
Prebble_ and_ Prebble_ Article. pdf>.
86. European Commission, Recommendation on Aggressive Tax Planning,
C(2012) 8806 final, 6 December 2012, at 2. This recommendation
addresses aggressive tax planning in the area of direct taxation.
87. OECD (2008), above n. 18, at 87. At 10 this study states that the term
aggressive tax planning evolved from the term ‘unacceptable tax mini-
mization arrangements’ which lacked a clear definition.
88. OECD (2008), above n. 18, at 87.
89. de Colle and Bennett, above n. 44 (§ 1.3). They are actually referring to
‘aggressive tax avoidance’.
90. Smits, above n. 77, at 52 referring to Jeanneret-Druckman. To Smits
legal engineering as such can be seen ‘as the creation of legal structures
that fulfil particular functional and practical purposes.’ The activity of
lawyers, accountants and other tax professionals to find the best legal
solution to a particular problem can however become extremely and,
indeed, aggressively focused on providing tax benefits. Cf. Douma,
above n. 77, at 27-8 and 41.
through which the income was derived, nor the dom-
icile of the group’s parent company.91
Multinational corporations engaging in aggressive tax
planning or on in tax sheltering typically see tax as a
profit centre.92 Thus, according to Kleinbard ‘U.S.-
domiciled multinational firms have become adroit at
moving income that as an economic matter is earned in
high-tax foreign countries to very low-taxed ones.’93
The large investments of these multinationals in aggres-
sive tax planning technologies are very cost effective
because, as Kleinbard points out, ‘they are unencum-
bered by any of the antiabuse rules to which non-U.S.
multinationals domiciled in jurisdictions with better
designed territorial systems might be subject’. In short,
aggressive tax planning while remaining within the let-
ter of the law boils down to gaming the international
system of rules as much as possible in order to maximise
tax benefits.
Thus, tax planning comes in different degrees. It may
be very aggressive (or even fraudulent, though the term
‘tax planning’ is probably better applied to lawful
behaviour only) but that need not be the case. Tax plan-
ning may entail tax avoidance when taxpayers are
arranging their affairs in order to pay less than their due
without for example avoiding double taxation. However,
one has the right to structure one’s tax affairs in a tax-
efficient way. Therefore, one cannot dismiss every
engagement in tax planning or tax avoidance as unethi-
cal out of hand. Consequently, the ethical assessment of
tax planning needs careful evaluation, being a matter of
degree. It is also a matter of responsibility. One should
not exercise a right in an irresponsible way. The same
goes for the right to structure one’s tax affairs to miti-
gate the amount of tax to be paid. However, there comes
a point where tax planning becomes irresponsible.
As long as mitigation or avoidance regards a relatively
small amount of tax, there seems not that much reason
to bother from an ethical perspective but when actions
become legally contrived, a turning point is reached. As
for example Judith Freedman argues, tax avoidance
becomes ‘reprehensible where the legal analysis deviates
from the economic substance and this is the case regard-
91. E.D. Kleinbard, ‘Through a Latte Darkly: Starbucks’ Stateless Income
Planning’, Tax Notes (24 June 2013), at 1517-1518.
92. Making use of tax shelters – again a term with no universally accepted
definition – can be classified as aggressive tax planning. Here, we see a
difference in terminology; J. Braithwaite, Markets in Vice, Markets in
Virtue, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2005), at 16: ‘What Austral-
ians refer to as the market for aggressive tax planning, Americans refer
to as the market for tax shelters.’ Cf. M. Hanlon and J. Slemrod, ‘What
Does Tax Aggressiveness Signal? Evidence from Stock Price Reactions to
News About Tax Shelter Involvement’, 93 Journal of Public Economics
1-2 (2009), at 127, fn 4: ‘Our use of the term refers to complex trans-
actions used by corporations to obtain significant tax benefits probably
never intended by the tax code; these transactions may not be illegal
per se and their use, if detected, may trigger lengthy processes of IRS
assessment and judicial appeal.’ Cf. Calderón Carrero and Quintas
Seara, above n. 79, at 209-10.
93. E.D. Kleinbard, ‘“Competitiveness”’ Has Nothing to Do With It’, Tax
Notes (1 September 2014), at 1055.
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less of the wording of the legislation in question’.94 In
short, tax planning aiming at the minimalising or even
eliminating their tax liability becomes morally irrespon-
sible.
6.3 Aggressive Corporate Tax Planning
The system of public goods and services paid for by tax-
es contributes to the success of businesses. In order to
be competitive and profitable, companies rely on gov-
ernment to educate young people who may become val-
uable employees, to provide for infrastructure enabling
workers to commute and efficient transport of goods, to
spark innovation, encourage investment, enhance work-
er productivity, raise production standards, and foster
the efficient use of scarce resources. Nonetheless, taxa-
tion is part of businesses’ cost-calculation, tax planning
being a means of saving in expenses. Corporations deftly
play with the rules thereby sharing a rule-focus with the
legislature. Complex and unclear rules are carefully
studied to be gamed with by businesses, and in turn the
legislature supplements the existing body of rules with
even more rules to curb this gaming. Thus, internation-
al companies seek to eliminate or reduce their tax liabili-
ties. In an international context multinational companies
nowadays exploit ‘areas where several tax systems must
interact and the scope for tax arbitrage, playing the rules
of one system off against another, is considerable’.95 Tax
authorities often respond by establishing detailed rules,
targeting relatively specific acts. However, taxpayers
may react by using the loopholes inevitably present in
very specific tax laws. Globalising corporations put
complex business structures in place, which are
extremely difficult for tax administrations to monitor
and control. The result is a downward spiral: ‘A smor-
gasbord of rules engenders a cat-and-mouse legal draft-
ing culture – of loophole closing and reopening by crea-
tive compliance,’ according to Braithwaite.96 Unfortu-
nately, the legislature cannot keep abreast of the tax
avoidance industry.97 Moreover, it takes time to appre-
ciate and respond to new tax avoiding structures; the
resulting time-lag between detecting and legislating
gives the aggressive tax planner a temporal advantage.
Businesses may maintain that bending the rules may
qualify as compliance, be it creative compliance with the
letter of the law. Nevertheless, taxpayers may comply
with (the letter of) the law, and still pay no tax at all. In
this way, they totally undermine the rationale behind
the words.98 The essence of creative compliance is that
it escapes the intended impact of the substantive law.
94. Freedman (2006), above n. 20, at 362.
95. J. Shaw, J. Slemrod & J. Whiting, ‘Administration and Compliance’, in
Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) (ed.), Dimensions of Tax Design: The
Mirrlees Review, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2010), at 1151.
96. Braithwaite, above n. 92, at 147.
97. Cf. C.D. Stone, ‘Why the Law Can’t Do It’, in T.L. Beauchamp and N.E.
Bowie (eds.), Ethical Theory and Business, Englewood Cliffs (NJ): Pren-
tice Hall (1993), at 163.
98. D. McBarnet, ‘When Compliance is not the Solution but the Problem:
From Changes in Law to Changes in Attitude’, in V. Braithwaite (ed.),
Taxing Democracy: Understanding Tax Avoidance and Evasion, Alder-
shot: Ashgate Publishing (2003), at 229-30.
Hence, these taxpayers evidently do not pay any fair
share of taxes at all. The right to structure one’s affairs
in a tax-efficient way is pulled across its moral bounda-
ries; this clearly does not show any sense of responsibili-
ty vis-à-vis society for the obligation to contribute
financially to society is ducked.
Very expert corporate taxpayers are apparently able to
determine the amount of tax they are willing to pay.
They are largely free to choose whether and how much
tax they want to pay. This violates the ideal of democra-
cy. As shown earlier, corporate lobbying accounts for
tax legislation, which is laws inevitably framed to meet
corporate demand. Moreover, many expert multination-
al corporations also work around and play around with
the existing tax rules. The latter goes at the expense of
public revenue in times of austerity and amounts to a
shift of the tax burden to less expert taxpayers, compa-
nies and citizens alike (level playing field). Maybe these
multinationals do not have the formal right to set their
own tax rates, but this is actually what often happens in
practice. Some taxpayers are apparently more equal
than others. This is a clear violation of one of democra-
cy’s basic tenets.
6.4 Undermining the Rule of Law
Aggressive tax planning implies dealing with the very
basic values of a legal system in an irresponsible way.
According to the German legal philosopher Gustav
Radbruch, the legal system is aimed at justice with (for-
mal) equality, legal certainty and purposiveness as its
core values.99 The purpose of tax law can be seen as
contributing to the maintenance of society consonant
with the requirement of distributive justice. Tax legisla-
tion serves (formal) legal equality and legal certainty, for
the legislature determines the amount of tax to be paid
and lays this down in tax laws with the purpose to
instantiate the ideal of distributive justice.
The rule of law requires government to function
through laws, i.e. general and abstract norms rather than
specific and concrete decrees, which would amount to
the rule of men. This requirement of general legislation
serves as an important protection against arbitrary inter-
ferences with individual rights and liberties by the pub-
lic authorities. This general law is opposed to any kind
of individual command. It is an abstract rule that does
not mention particular cases or individually nominated
persons, but is issued to apply to all cases and persons in
the abstract.100 The capacity of law to provide security
depends on a purely formal characteristic of law, namely
its abstractness. By contrast, the capacity of law to pro-
mote equality stems from another formal characteristic
of law, viz. the nature of the general norm as one which
applies not just to an individual but to a class of individ-
99. G. Radbruch, Legal Philosophy (trans. K. Wilk), in The Legal Philoso-
phies of Lask, Radbruch, and Dabin, Cambridge (MA): Harvard Univer-
sity Press (1950), at 99 ff. See Gribnau (2014), above n. 53, at
185-217; <http:// papers. ssrn. com/ sol3/ papers. cfm ?abstract_ id= 246
1247>.
100. F.L. Neumann, The Rule of Law. Political Theory and the Legal System
in Modern Society, Leamington Spa: Berg Publishers (1986), at 212-13.
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uals and which can even be formed by all the members
of a social group or society.101
Taxpayers deliberately structuring their affairs with an
exclusive focus on the letter of the law exploit these two
important formal characteristics of legislation. They
appeal to the values of legal certainty and equality
derived from the letter of the law, which is not conso-
nant with distributive justice, which the legislature had
in mind. They plan towards the inevitable imperfections
of a system of tax rules. The legal qualification of their
behaviour deviates from the economic substance, which
is thus not taxed as it should be. Thus legal certainty
and equality, important legal values meant to protect
taxpayers against abuse of power of government and
other citizens, are used to frustrate distributive justice.
The underlying attitude towards tax law reflects a strict
formalistic view on the rule of law, entailing an ethical
position based on a strict separation of law and
morals.102 Take for example the legal positivist Raz, who
compares law to a knife. ‘A good knife is, among other
things, a sharp knife. Similarly, conformity to the rule
of law is an inherent value of law, indeed it is their most
important inherent value.’103 Like other instruments,
‘the law has a specific virtue which is morally neutral in
being neutral as to the end to which it the instrument is
put.’ Aggressive tax planning takes advantage of law’s
adherence to formality at the expense of the substantive
value of distributive justice. The formality of tax law, as
Prebble and Prebble argue, ‘is an essential prerequisite
for contriving artificial transactions that enable the crea-
tors of the transactions or their clients to avoid tax’. To
their minds, the benefits to society of legal certainty are
thus outweighed by its detriments. I fully agree that this
irresponsible behaviour ‘exploits the formality of the law
and, in doing so, exploits the values of the rule of law
itself’.104
6.5 Tax Professionals
If law is seen as a knife, it is open to different uses. Tax
law has become a very complex system of rules and
principles, studied and applied by highly specialised
professionals. Different types of professionals may pro-
vide tax advice, e.g. exclusive tax advisers, lawyers,
accountants and others – in some jurisdictions the regu-
latory framework reserves tax advice exclusively to the
tax advisory profession.105 These professionals fulfil an
101. N. Bobbio, ‘The Rule of Men or the Rule of Law’, in N. Bobbio (ed.),
The Future of Democracy, Minneapolis (MN): University of Minnesota
Press (1987), at 143-4.
102. Gribnau (2015a), above n. 43, at 234-6.
103. J. Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtue’ [1977], in J. Raz (ed.), The
Authority of Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2009), at 214. See
for a discussion of Raz’s position and a comparison with Hayek’s and
Fuller’s position: H. Gribnau, ‘Legal Certainty: A Matter of Principle’, in
H. Gribnau and M. Pauwels (eds.), Retroactivity of Tax Legislation,
Amsterdam: EATLP (2013); <http:// papers. ssrn. com/ sol3/ papers. cfm ?
abstract_ id= 2447386>.
104. Prebble and Prebble, above n. 85, at 45.
105. See D. De Widt, E. Mulligan & L. Oats, Regulating Tax Advisers: A
European Comparison of Recent Developments and Future Trends,
FairTax: Working Paper Series nr. 6, 2016; <http:// umu. diva -portal. org/
smash/ record. jsf ?pid= diva2%3A1055242& dswid= -4894>.
important function, for many people are not able to
meet their tax obligations without professional assis-
tance. However, very expert tax advisers also use the
legal knife to minimise the amount of tax paid by their
client or employer. Tax professionals are thus involved
in aggressive tax planning practices – doing their job in
accounting firms, law firms or other tax advisory firms,
in financial institutions or in large corporate taxpayers’
(internal) tax departments.106 They set up often very
complicated structures – which may have some aesthetic
attraction.107 According to the UK Public Accounts
Committee, the four large accounting firms Deloitte,
Ernst and Young, KPMG, and PwC have guidelines ‘to
govern their tax advice, but they are still devising com-
plex schemes that look artificial and their appetite for
risk appears high – selling schemes that they consider
only have a 50% chance of being upheld in court.’108
Tax professionals exploit legal indeterminacy ‘which is
due to the disjuncture between legal form and economic
purpose since different legal forms can be devised to
achieve the same or a similar economic purpose’.109
Thus the legislature has regulated certain behaviour
based on a set of facts, and the tax professional devises a
scheme with a different legal form for about the same
economic substance. As Bogenschneider observes, cor-
porate aggressive tax planning typically involves the
‘manufacture’ of a factually indeterminate transaction
based on a purely formalistic understanding of tax
laws.110 In addition, the ‘audit lottery’ is often played: a
favourable position – that the tax administration would
likely challenge – is taken in the tax return without dis-
closure (for it is known that the risk of detection is mini-
mal).111 In this way, tax law is used as a tool to decon-
struct and demolish the system, which distributes the
106. Cf. OECD (2008), above n. 17, at 5. Often tax schemes are not devel-
oped in response to any request from a company, see P. Sikka and H.
Wilmott, ‘The Tax Avoidance Industry: Accountancy Firms on the
Make’, Working Paper, EBS Working Papers, Colchester 2013:6 who
quote a former Commissioner of the US Internal Revenue Service refer-
ring to a senior tax partner instructing ‘to ignore a particular set of IRS
disclosure rules. The reasoning was that the IRS ‘was unlikely to discov-
er the underlying transactions and that even if it did, any penalties
assessed would be absorbed as a cost of doing business.
107. This is very well captured by A. Campbell, On the Floor, London: Ser-
pent’s Tail (2012), at 35: ‘He creates complex financial structures like a
child dresses a doll in different outfits.’
108. Public Accounts Committee (House of Commons), above n. 22, at 5.
Cf. S.T. McGuire, T.C. Omer & D. Wang, ‘Tax Avoidance: Does Tax-
Specific Industry Expertise Make a Difference?’, 87 The Accounting
Review 3 (2012), at 975-1003 who argue that clients purchasing tax
services from their external audit firm engage in greater tax avoidance
when their external audit firm is a tax expert. Moreover, the tax-specific
industry expertise of external audit firms appears to play a significant
role in its clients’ tax avoidance.
109. S. Picciotto, ‘Indeterminacy, Complexity, Technocracy and the Reform
of International Corporate Taxation’, 24 Social and Legal Studies 2
(2015), at 170.
110. B. Bogenschneider, ‘Professional Ethics for the Tax lawyer to the Hol-
mesian “Bad Man”’, 49 Creighton Law Review (2016) at 779: He
explains: ‘the corporate tax “planner” takes one set of given facts,
where the application of tax law appears to determinatively result in the
payment of tax under the law, and prospectively changes these facts to
a second set of facts, where the application of the tax law is indetermi-
nate.’
111. Braithwaite, above n. 92, at 114; Sikka and Wilmott, above n. 106.
25
Hans Gribnau doi: 10.5553/ELR.000082 - ELR August 2017 | No. 1
This article from Erasmus Law Review is published by Eleven international publishing and made available to Universiteit Leiden
tax burden over society and reduce it to its technicalities
– thus separating its formal legal aspects from the
instantiation of distributive justice it embodies. Tax law
is disembodied from one of its intrinsic values. The let-
ter of the law is hypostasised. However, the legality of a
transaction or structure is not by definition sufficient to
label it as morally acceptable. These professionals there-
fore do not take their responsibility for the integrity of
the tax system very seriously. They act just like hired
guns neglecting their public responsibility, for like all
citizens they have a responsibility not to undermine ‘the
public frameworks that sustain our common exis-
tence’.112
These professionals adhere to and exploit formal charac-
teristics of law. Formal conceptions of (the rule of) law
are mistaken in making legal values absolute. However,
as Radbruch rightly argues, ‘non-conclusiveness’ is a
crucial feature of (legal) values. In practice, these com-
ponents of justice must be constantly weighed and bal-
anced, for there is no hierarchy between these funda-
mental legal values. This accounts for their non-conclu-
siveness (which they have in common with princi-
ples).113 Therefore, invoking values such as legal cer-
tainty implies taking other values into account and per-
form a balancing act. A value disproportionally nega-
tively impacted may be a sound reason to not let it pre-
vail over another value.
To my mind, therefore, morally acceptable tax planning
cannot be reduced to a formalistic compliance with tax
rules. The ethical stance involved in the interpretation
and use of legal rules should be less formalistic. Ethical
behaviour cannot be reduced to strict rule-following –
deliberately disregarding the underlying values and
principles of the tax system.114 Rules demand interpre-
tation, which in turn should be guided by some ethical
view. But even if clear-cut rules are available, formalistic
compliance with the rules of two or more different tax
jurisdictions may result in the payment of nil corporate
tax in each of these countries. Perfectly legal and com-
pliant behaviour, therefore, may lead to a result that
might be deemed illegitimate and unethical.115 Thus,
irresponsibility is disguised in the cloak of legality.
112. R.W. Gordon, ‘Why Lawyers Can’t Just be Hired Guns’, in D.L. Rhode
(ed.), Ethics in Practice: Lawyers’ Roles, Responsibilities, and Regula-
tion, New York / Oxford: Oxford University Press (2003), at 47.
113. Gribnau (2014), above n. 53, at 185-217; <http:// papers. ssrn. com/
sol3/ papers. cfm ?abstract_ id= 2461247>.
114. Dworkin, above n. 2, at 300-1. Cf. Gribnau (2015a), above n. 42, at
241-5.
115. Cf. R.F. van Brederode, ‘A Normative Evaluation of Tax Law Enforce-
ment: Legislative and Political Responses to Tax Avoidance and Eva-
sion’, 42 Intertax 12 (2014), at 768 on the doctrine that recognises ‘the
right of an individual to structure his affairs as he sees fit and to lower
his taxes as long as this does not violate the spirit of the law.’
7 Tax Corporate
Irresponsibility
7.1 Corporate Moral Agency
As shown earlier, very expert corporate taxpayers are
apparently able to determine their tax liability. They are
largely free to choose whether and how much tax they
will pay. However, responsibility comes with freedom.
Corporations are therefore required act, for example in
regard to their tax planning, responsibly by confining
their pursuit of self-interest. This begs the question: can
a corporation act responsibly? Does a corporation have
the freedom to act and bear responsibility for its actions
like a natural person has freedom and responsibility? It
is clear that a corporation has freedom to choose among
different options within the boundaries of the law. But
how about corporate responsibility?
There is no denying that a corporation differs from a
natural person. Individuals are raised in a community.
They are made to behave responsibly, i.e. to take into
account the interests of others to some extent, e.g. by
identification with others brought about by socialisation
and external sanctions.116 Coleman argues that the large
modern corporation ‘has none of the encumbrances,
responsibilities, and informal community obligations
that arose through the personal and family connections
of the owner of the old, family-based corporation’.117
His point is that the modern multinational corporation
is not embedded in a community to which it is tied by
(informal) obligations. Hence, socialisation and norms
applied to natural persons no longer constitute effective
means for ensuring responsible corporate action, for
corporations are constructed ‘around the positions of
which natural persons are merely temporary occu-
pants’.118
Nonetheless, in their communication multinationals like
Nike convey the image of an ‘actual’ personality rather
than just a concrete corporate person. Thus Nike aspires
to be one of the few global leaders with an actual per-
sonality in which customers believe instead of just buy-
ing its goods.119 This self-image of an ‘actual’ personali-
ty reinforces the conviction that morality does not
regard only individuals. Corporations qualify as moral
agents as well, because they ‘have their own decision-
making structures, have choices, and justify them with
corporate reasons’.120 Corporations are legal entities, i.e.
artificial persons in law, but also moral entities, i.e. they
have agency independent of their members. Companies
can refrain from harming others. Moreover, they can
account for their behaviour by giving moral reasons and
116. J. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory, Cambridge (MA) / London:
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press (1990), at 556.
117. Coleman, above n. 116, at 559.
118. Coleman, above n. 116, at 576.
119. Barber, above n. 34, at 67. He makes reference to Nike’s 1992 Annual
Report.
120. M.T. Brown, Corporate Integrity: Rethinking Organizational Ethics and
Leadership, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2005), at 123. See
Gribnau and Jallai, above n. 10, at 4-5.
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assume moral responsibility for their actions affecting
others. Thus, corporations have a kind of moral respon-
sibility that differs from the responsibility of the indi-
viduals constituting the corporation. Companies engag-
ing in corporate social responsibility (CSR) are an exam-
ple of moral agency. They are part of society, which
entails obligations towards society. It may be more diffi-
cult for a multinational corporation to take the morally
correct action because operating in many countries
affects usually many more stakeholders than a national
firm. Nonetheless, the increased difficulty does not
change the nature of the moral obligation: ‘multination-
als, like nationals, are required to consider the interests
of all corporate stakeholders’.121
7.2 MNCs Engaging in CSR
Multinationals often have a huge impact on society and
communities.122 Many multinational corporations
nowadays emphasise their connections with communi-
ties. Take for example Starbucks: they believe that they
should have ‘a positive impact on the communities we
serve’.123 In the same vein, Kris Engskov, managing
director, Starbucks Coffee Company, UK, states: ‘the
most important asset we have built is trust. Trust with
our partners (employees), our customers and the wider
society in which we operate’.124 So apparently a multi-
national like Starbucks feels embedded in society and
therefore attaches great interest to good relations with
stakeholders – implying trust and confidence. It shows
concern for society and it claims to have internalised
external interests, viz. the interests of society at large.
Thus, the OECD pointing at ‘the mutual dependence of
business and society’ seemingly perfectly captures Star-
bucks’ ideas. Actually, Starbucks cannot but endorse the
OECD’s point of view that it is all about corporate
responsibility, where CSR refers to ‘the actions taken by
businesses to nurture and enhance this symbiotic rela-
tionship’.125 The OECD correctly states that this symbi-
otic relationship is not a given but involves a search for
an effective ‘fit’ between businesses and the societies in
which they operate. CSR should include tax, for corpo-
rate responsibility should cover all corporate behaviour.
Selective shopping is out of the question, for it would
imply the company lacking integrity. Starbucks, there-
121. N. Bowie, ‘The Moral Obligations of Multinational Corporations’, in
Beauchamp and Bowie 1993, at 520.
122. Cf. Tapscott and Ticoll, above n. 33, at 183: ‘When Starbucks opens a
store, it may change the character of a neighborhood. When it buys
more Fair Trade coffee, it may change the social, political, economic
and environmental dynamics of a town in El Salvador. When it puts Wi-
Fi into a café, it may become a hub for a local business community – or
a peace demonstration.’
123. John Kelly, senior vice president, Global Responsibility and Public Policy
at <www. starbucks. co. uk/ our -commitment>. He tells us that in ‘2008
we set a series of ambitious goals where we felt we could use our scale
for the greatest good in the areas of ethical sourcing, environmental
impact and community improvement.
124. An Open Letter from Kris Engskov, 06 December 2012; <www.
starbucks. co. uk/ blog/ an -open -letter -from -kris -engskov/ 1249>.
125. OECD, Corporate Social Responsibility: Frequently Asked Questions,
<www. oecd. org/ corporate/ mne/
corporateresponsibilityfrequentlyaskedquestions. htm>, accessed 4
October 2016.
fore, should make sure that it is not an example of cor-
porations that talk ‘about social responsibility, but
indulge in tax avoidance and evasion’.126
MNCs’ voluntary engagement in CSR is acceptance of
ethical obligations beyond (strict) compliance with the
law. The acceptance of legal obligations as well as duties
that, though not required by law, ‘underscore and
reflect the nature of the company as an essentially social
entity’.127 Legal obligations, therefore, should not be
narrowed down to the letter of the law nor should
MNCs use and manipulate the tax rules without regard
for the underlying principles in order to minimise their
tax liability.
Companies should thus think in terms of good tax gov-
ernance whereby tax is not seen as just a cost. Here,
there is a role to play for – both in-house and external –
tax advisers who have a relationship of trust with their
clients, for example by making ‘a clear commercial case
for responsible behaviour based on evidence of a “busi-
ness case” for CSR’.128 Tax adviser Van Eijsden indeed
provides a business case to include tax as a corporate
responsibility issue.129 It follows that tax advisers should
make sure that the corporation’s tax practice is aligned
with its CSR strategy. The same goes for external tax
advisers on whom a company relies, they have to assume
responsibility and take care to connect their recommen-
ded tax planning structures with the company’s CSR
strategy.130 Very expert tax professionals also have the
capacity ‘to play a constructive role in the development
of better tax legislation’.131 They should therefore par-
ticipate in policy discussions and committees in order to
enhance the integrity of the tax system.
Still, the question is what is corporate responsibility
with regard to tax? What kind of responsibility has a
company in relation to tax? There is no consensus on
principles of tax fairness yet, which flesh out the ideal of
a fair share in international taxation and offer multina-
tional companies guidance. The ideal of a fair share is
therefore too vague, ambiguous and abstract to give
clear guidance on the amount of (corporate) tax to be
paid by multinational corporations. Moreover, the spe-
cific economic nature of the (legal) obligation to pay tax
has to be taken into account: everyone has the right to
structure one’s tax affairs in a tax-efficient way. This
goes for enterprises and citizens alike. Thus self-interes-
ted behaviour collides with the interest of society, the
126. P. Sikka, ‘Smoke and Mirrors: Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax
Avoidance’, 34 Accounting Forum (2010), at 153-68.
127. J. Canals, Building Respected Companies: Rethinking Business Leader-
ship and the Purpose of the Firm, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press (2010), at 147.
128. H. Ward, Corporate Responsibility and the Business of Law, London
(2005), at 11; <http:// pubs. iied. org/ pdfs/ G00195. pdf>.
129. A. van Eijsden, ‘The Relationship between Corporate Responsibility and
Tax: Unknown and Unloved,’ EC Tax Review 1 (2013), at 56-61. Cf.
Williams, above n. 17.
130. Cf. M.D. Bayles, ‘The Professional-Client Relationship’, in C. Callahan
(ed.), Ethical Issues in Professional Life, New York / Oxford: Oxford
University Press (1988), at 119.
131. G. Brock and H. Russell, ‘Abusive Tax Avoidance and Institutional Cor-
ruption: The Responsibilities of Tax Professionals’, Edmond J. Safra
Research Lab Working Papers, 2015 No. 56, 17 February, at 34.
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results of self-interested actions negatively affect the
well-being of other persons (taxpayers).
How should these diverging interests be balanced? As
argued earlier, irresponsible behaviour is behaviour that
does not sufficiently take into account the interests of
others – bringing (disproportionate) harm to them (Sec-
tion 2.2). To my mind, MNEs do well to avoid aiming
to pay a minimalist amount of (corporate income) taxes
– thus eroding the integrity of the (international) tax
system. Their aim should be to avoid corporate tax irre-
sponsibility: evidently not paying a fair share. In prac-
tice, it is far easier to agree on evident instances of injus-
tice than on what counts as justice.132 So given the right
to structure one’s affairs so as not to pay too much tax,
the primary aim should be to avoid irresponsible and
profoundly unfair tax planning rather than to strive for
the vague ideal of paying a fair share.
8 Conclusion
The international tax system is the result of the interac-
tion of different actors, such as legislatures, tax adminis-
trations, courts, taxpayers, tax advisers and international
organisations, who share the responsibility for its integ-
rity. This article mainly focused on states and multina-
tional corporations (and their tax advisers). They both
enjoy to a certain extent freedom of choice with regard
to their tax behaviour – which entails moral responsibil-
ity. Making, interpreting and using tax rules therefore is
inevitably a matter of exercising responsibility. Both
should abstain from viewing tax laws as a bunch of tech-
nical rules to be used as a tool without any intrinsic
moral or legal value. States bear primary responsibility
for the integrity of the international tax system. They
should become more reticent in their use of tax as regu-
latory instrument – competing with one another for
multinationals’ investment. States should act more
responsibly by cooperating to make better rules to pre-
vent aggressive tax planning, which entails a (dispropor-
tionate) shift in tax payments from very expert taxpay-
ers to other taxpayers. Here, the distributive justice of
the tax system and a level playing field should be guar-
anteed. Multinationals should abstain from putting
pressure on states and lobbying for favourable tax rules,
which disproportionally affect other taxpayers – SMEs
and individual taxpayers alike. In the same vein, multi-
nationals and their professional advisers should avoid
irresponsible conduct by not aiming to pay a minimalist
amount of (corporate income) taxes – merely staying
within the boundaries of the letter of the law. Shared
responsibility should be taken seriously by both states
and multinational corporations; they should not pass the
responsibility for the integrity of the tax system to the
other party. This goes all the more for companies
engaging in CSR. Future research could flesh out prin-
132. A.-G. Jallai and J.L.M. Gribnau, ‘Free to Choose? Responsible Tax plan-
ning, Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Irresponsibility’, TLS
Working Paper, forthcoming.
ciples of good tax governance for both states and multi-
national corporations in order to enhance accountability
and transparency and enable monitoring by stakehold-
ers.
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